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Introduction
1 Because  words  apparently  have  less  immediate  power  than brute  physical  force  to
change the course of events in the material world and yet exercise a more durable
influence on the minds and the actions of men, the relations between language and
power have fascinated thinkers for centuries, even millennia. One early precursor of
investigations into these relations was Gorgias, a sophist in ancient Greece to whom
Plato gives centre stage in the Gorgias, one of the philosopher’s most famous dialogues.
In his Encomium of Helen,  Gorgias underlines the influence of language on men—and
women, Helen of Troy in this case—with remarkable economy of means: “Speech is a
powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest
works […].” (Patrick, 2012: 11)
2 In the field of English for Specific Purposes (ESP), there has been some recent interest
in the subject: in The Handbook of English for Specific Purposes, Sue Starfield explains how
many ESP authors have been influenced by the “critical turn” in language studies that
took place in the 1970s and ’80s. Instead of merely describing language and discourse
mechanisms assumed to be politically neutral and in the natural order of social things,
critical theorists brought to light the generally hidden ways by which language and
discourse1 can influence minds, manipulate opinion and create and maintain unequal
relations of power (Fairclough, 1989: 5, 13–14, 109–39; Paltridge & Starfield, 2013: 461–
4). Critical approaches study the part played by language in ideologies, politics, racial
and sexual issues, the media, cultural and linguistic imperialism, the consumer society,
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advertising, capitalism… (Fairclough, 1989; Simpson, Mayr & Statham, 2019). For their
part,  ESP authors generally  tend to  focus  on power  issues  in  the  classroom,  needs
analysis, genre theory and insider/outsider asymmetries (Orts, Breeze & Gotti, 2017).
3 While we consider critical  approaches in ESP are justified and necessary,  this paper
does not follow the mainstream critical path. It intends to analyse the relationships
between  language  and  power  in  a  descriptive  way,  and  we  wish  to  explain  why.
ESP authors may have been influenced by the “critical turn” in language studies a few
decades ago, but the fact that they study “specialised varieties of English” (SVEs) does
not appear to have been specifically factored into their critical approaches. We believe
that, among the many research undertakings involving ESP, one of the most important
is to account for the process of language specialisation that generates SVEs. As will be
suggested in the coming pages,  language-power mechanisms are built  into the very
process of specialisation and, to our knowledge, these mechanisms have not yet been
adequately described. It is the purpose of this paper to analyse the power of language in
the specialisation processes that generate SLs, and also create specialists, specialised
communities and specialised domains. Because of the specialised character of the SVEs
under study, not only is such a descriptive stage necessary in ESP, but it should precede
critical stages since describing objects of study influences the critical outlook we may
have on them (see Searle, 2010: 201).
4 One appropriate starting point to launch this descriptive project could be to follow the
lead of the views expressed in Language and Power by Paul Simpson, Andrea Mayr and
Simon Statham, published in 2009 (and reedited in 2019). Though the authors deal with
general English—there is no mention at all  of ESP—their work helps understand the
shift from general English to ESP. In chapter A2 on “The discourse of institutions and
organizations”, the authors focus on the relationship between language and power in
institutional contexts because they see institutions as “inextricably linked to power”:
Institutions  have  considerable  control  over  the  organizing  of  our  routine
experiences of the world and the way we classify that world. They therefore have
the power to foster particular kinds of identities to suit their own purposes because
they are primary sites for ‘reality construction’ […].  (Simpson, Mayr & Statham,
2019: 7)
5 In this context, we would like to highlight the point regarding the idea that institutions
play a  crucial  role  in  the construction of  social  reality.  The authors  then go on to
develop the idea further as follows:
Linguistic and discourse analytical approaches to institutional research generally
regard  linguistic  exchange  as  an  important  aspect  of  interaction  (Fairclough  &
Wodak, 1997) where language is understood as constitutive of organizations and
institutions.  From  this  perspective,  language  is  the  principal  means  by  which
institutions create their own social reality. […] Organizations exist only in so far as
their  members  create  them  through  discourse.  This  is  not  a  claim  that
organisations are ‘nothing but discourse’, but rather that discourse is the principal
means  by  which  organizational  members  create  a  coherent  social  reality  that
frames their sense of who they are. (Mumby & Clair, 1997: 181, cited in ibid.: 7)
6 Although the authors clearly uphold the fact that institutions create social reality, they
fail to provide any explanation as to how such a feat is achieved in practice, leaving
readers to wonder how the mechanism of institutional “reality construction” actually
works. Another puzzling observation is the fact that a highly prominent author who
has specifically addressed the issue of how institutional reality construction operates is
never  mentioned:  in  two  seminal  titles, The Construction  of  Social  Reality (1995)  and 
ESP Power Issues from the Perspective of an Intentional Approach to Specialis...
ILCEA, 40 | 2020
2
Making  the  Social  World (2010),  John Searle,  an  American  philosopher  specialising  in
language and social theory, offers an explanation on how our social world is created
and maintained by language thanks to institutional constitutive rules—and though one
may not agree with his proposals, they are, nevertheless, worth mentioning if only to
be criticised.
7 The fact of including the creation of social reality into the debate is crucial since, as we
will  try to show, specialisation is  one such created social  reality.  The language and
power mechanisms that make such creation possible need to be studied to clarify the
relations between language and power in the ESP context.  However,  in spite of the
validity  of  Simpson,  Mayr  and  Statham’s  ideas,  we  must  move  beyond  mere
declarations  and  attempt  to  show  how  social  facts  can  emerge  from  institutional
language mechanisms. Searle’s theoretical proposals matter here because they show
that the construction of social reality involves innumerable and highly sophisticated
collective  mechanisms in  which language  and power  are  closely  interwoven.  These
proposals have contributed to a better understanding of the specialisation processes
that  generate  specialised  languages  and  constitute  the  foundations  of  a  research
project  known  as  the  “Intentional  Approach” (IA)  to  SLs  based  on  the  theory  of
intentionality  developed  by  Searle  (1983,  2004;  Van der Yeught,  2016,  2018,  2019a,
2019b, 2020).
8 The purpose of this paper is to study the relations between language and power in SVEs
as envisaged by IA. The first section offers a synthetic presentation of IA that takes the
reader  from intentionality  to  specialisedness,  social  reality,  institutions,  and to  the
power of language in social creation. The second section concerns the specific types of
powers—“deontic  powers”—assigned  in  keeping  with  the  institutional  statuses  and
functions of social agents, examined firstly as attached to specialist status and then to
the use of SLs by specialists. In the third section, we examine how deontic powers can
enrich our view of critical  approaches to languages and discuss one of  Fairclough’s
diagnoses in two discourse exchanges between protagonists. The discussion then moves
on to the case of power-language relationships in the “plain language movement”. In
section 4, after revisiting the real power of language, we explain that language in itself
is essentially powerless. To conclude, a few pedagogical opportunities offered by the
language-power theme in ESP are examined, with a special focus on the importance of
making learners aware of the deontic powers of their specialisms.
 
1. Power and language mechanisms in the Intentional
Approach to specialised languages
1.1. The origins of the Intentional Approach
9 In our view, one of the main problems in ESP research is that SLs are rarely, if ever,
regarded by scholars as objects of study in their own right, leading to an absence of
theories explaining what they are.  Two recent definitions of ESP describe it  as “the
teaching and learning of English as a second or foreign language where the goal of the
learners is to use English in a particular domain” (Paltridge & Starfield, 2013: 2), and as
[…]  an  approach  to  language  teaching  that  targets  the  current  and/or  future
academic  or  occupational  needs  of  learners,  focuses  on the necessary language,
genres and skills to address these needs and assists learners in meeting these needs
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through  the  use  of  general  and/or  discipline-specific  materials  and  methods.
(Anthony, 2018: 1)
Neither of these two major publications has a chapter devoted to theory as evidenced
by the fact there is no “theory” entry in their indexes.
10 The Intentional Approach endeavours to fill that scientific gap by postulating that such
language  phenomena—SLs  like  financial  English,  medical  German  or  legal  French—
exist, and that they can be legitimate objects of study in their own right. Further, it
observes that SLs emerge as derivations of professional or disciplinary specialisation—
e.g. medical English emerged as a result of medical specialisation and not vice versa—
and  it  logically  concludes  that  a  theory  of  SLs  requires  a  preceding  theory  of
specialisation  to  make  sense.  And yet,  while  innumerable  forms  of  human
specialisation have been extensively studied—in economics,  social studies,  industrial
and technological sciences…—what specialisation is in itself, per se, has rarely attracted
the interest of researchers (Van der Yeught, 2016: 42; 2019b: 54–6).
 
1.2. From intentionality to specialisedness
11 Our suggestion is that specialisation, at its core, is a mental phenomenon that belongs
to  a  large  group of  “intentional  mental  states”  as  John Searle  describes  them.  For
Searle, intentionality is “that capacity of the mind by which mental states refer to, or
are about, or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other than themselves”
(2004: 19,  112; see also 1983: 1).  These intentional states are accompanied by sets of
beliefs and desires concerning the object. These beliefs and desires need to be satisfied
and constitute,  as such, the purpose of intentionalities (Searle,  2004:  118–9).  In this
explanatory context, we posit that particular intentional states are not fleeting mental
dispositions, as most are in our daily lives, but may be considered “specialised” when
the  mind  directs  itself  towards  one  specific  object  of  the  world  in  a  selected,
concentrated and durable way (Van der Yeught 2016: 46–8; 2019b: 63).  Consequently,
“specialisedness”,  the  fact  of  being  specialised,  is  the  main  characteristic  of  all
phenomena that derive from specialised intentional states.
 
1.3. From collective intentionality to the creation of social reality
12 Intentional states are individual to begin with, but Searle shows that they can become
collective when shared by a number of persons, as when people play in an orchestra or
in a football team, take part in trade unions or set up political campaigns. “Collective
intentionality” wields considerable social power in that it has the capacity to create
social  reality.  Such  social  realties  are  created  through  collectively  accepted
“constitutive  rules”  that  allocate  functional  power Y  to  objects X  in  contexts C,
following an implicit or explicit verbal declaration that “X counts as Y in C”. Searle’s
own preferred example concerns the creation of the social reality of money through
the rule “X (this specific piece of paper) counts as Y (a $20 bill) in C (the United States
of  America)”  (1995:  37–51;  2010: 10).  Such  created  social  realities  are  said  to  be
“instituted” and are called “institutions” because they result from declarations that are
accepted by collective intentionalities. Although Simpson, Mayr and Statham claim that
“the concept of institution itself is curiously hard to define” (2019: 9), in the context of
Searle’s social ontology, the concept is fairly simple to grasp: institutions refer to any
social realities that result from collectively accepted constitutive rules and can, in turn,
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likewise  create  new institutions.  Searle  provides  a  substantial  list  of  the  extremely
diverse forms these institutions may take. They may be organisations, i.e. social groups
composed of members and regulated by statutes, rules or bye laws (corporations, trade
unions,  churches,  sports  clubs,  political  parties,  schools…),  but  they  may  also  be
memberless  social  practices  such  as  money, private  property,  the  U.S.  presidency,
university tenures, birthday parties, etc. (Searle, 2010: 91–2).
 
1.4. Specialised communities, domains and languages as
institutions
13 By  the  same  power  of  the  “X counts  as Y  in C”  rule,  specialised  collective
intentionalities  can  also  create  specialised  social  realities  to  serve  their  purposes.
Specialised communities organise themselves into specialised organisations (scientific
institutes,  professional  bodies,  research laboratories,  learned societies…)  and create
social objects to meet their needs (procedures,  symposia,  projects and programmes,
professional symbols and logos, uniforms and medals, professional wear and attire…).
One example we find particularly illustrative in this context is the institution of the
U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) because its very name illustrates
the  validity  of  the  collectively  accepted  “X counts  as Y”  rule.  Although  specialised
domains such as physics, banking, medicine, law and accounting are not institutions
because  they  do  not  derive  from  collectively  accepted  constitutive  rules,  they
nevertheless contain an infinite number of related institutions that do.
14 This  analysis  naturally  applies  to  the  specialisation  of  languages.  Specialised
communities also use the “X counts as Y in C” rule to create new words, expressions,
phrases, collocations, or to give new meaning to existing words. One example of the
latter could be: “bears (X) count as pessimistic investors (Y) in English-speaking stock
market contexts (C)”, while bulls are optimistic punters. By the same token, specialised
genres emerge to serve specialised intentionalities. SLs are institutions that are created
by  the  same  language-power  mechanisms  as  all  other  creations  of  social  reality
(Van der Yeught, 2019: chap. 2).
 
1.5. The power of language in the process of social creation
15 The Intentional Approach adopts the view that language generates enormous social
creative power through very simple verbal declarations that are constitutive of the
social facts they generate (Searle, 1995: 37). In this sense, Gorgias was right when he
said language “effects the divinest works […] by means of the finest and most invisible
body”—which Searle seems to echo when he writes that “there is an element of magic,
a  conjuring  trick,  a  sleight  of  hand”  in  the  creation  of  institutional  facts  through
language (ibid.: 45). He also adds that we live in a “sea of institutional reality” which is
constituted by language, but remain largely unaware of the part played by language in
the process (2010: 90). Owing to the way it is created, institutional reality has specific
ontological  characteristics:  it is  ontologically  subjective,  but  epistemologically
objective.  In other words,  its  existence depends on the intentional mental  states of
subjects (hence, its ontology is subjective); yet, once created, institutions can be studied
as objects of knowledge in their own right (hence, they are epistemologically objective)
(Searle, 1995: 7–9, 12–13, 190–4; 2010: 17–18).
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16 The immense universe of specialisedness in our societies is a reality created in the same
way.  It  contains, inter alia,  specialised  languages  that  result  from  specialised
intentionalities and their related constitutive rules, and which can be studied, taught
and learnt in ESP. In this respect, IA is at odds with Hutchinson and Waters’ remark
that “ESP is not a  matter of  teaching ‘specialised varieties’  of English.  The fact  that
language is used for a specific purpose does not imply that it is a special form of the
language different in kind from other forms” (1987: 18). The approach presented in this
paper shows that these SVEs actually do exist as rule-created institutional realities.
 
2. Institutions and deontic powers in general and in
specialised contexts
17 With regard to the “X counts as Y in C” rule, the Y “functions” assigned to X objects by
constitutive rules include specific forms of power that Searle calls “deontic powers”
which we now analyse in the framework of specialised contexts.
 
2.1. The characteristics of deontic powers
18 Institutions are invaluable in human societies as they are enabling structures.  They
provide human agents with powers that are far greater and more diversified than the
mere physical or material powers they would otherwise wield as persons deprived of
institutional functions (Searle, 2010: 105). These “deontic powers” serve the purposes
of their underlying intentionalities by regulating relations between people. They assign
balanced sets of positive and negative powers that enable agents to do certain things
and prevent them from doing others. Positive powers include rights, responsibilities,
privileges,  entitlements,  authorisations,  qualifications…;  negative  powers  include
obligations, interdictions, duties, penalties, etc. (Searle, 1995: 100). In many cases, these
deontic powers are codified in the form of charters of ethics and codes of deontology—
the Hippocratic Oath is arguably the first codification of the deontic powers of ancient
Greek healers. By the same token, constitutive rules may terminate or nullify statuses
with the effect of disempowering agents: presidents, directors and status holders of all
types lose their deontic powers when they step down.
19 In the universe of specialisedness, deontic powers are also widespread in specialised
professional and disciplinary communities.  The “X counts as Y” rule often takes the
form  of  university  degrees,  professional  certifications  and  charters,  access  to  job
positions or titles that assign statuses and functions together with their related deontic
powers  to academics,  accountants,  surgeons,  scientists,  lawyers…  (Searle,  1995: 87).
These  powers  serve  the  specialised  intentionalities  of  their  respective  domains  by
imposing sets of rights and obligations on status holders. They mostly apply to agents’
activities  (curing  patients,  managing  bank  accounts,  making  legal  rulings,  trading
stocks…), but they may also concern SL use and, as such, it is of interest for ESP actors
to examine which deontic powers specifically apply to SL use by specialists.
 
2.2. Deontic powers in the use of specialised languages
20 Although most specialists are not linguists, SL use is a key capacity in their mission to
serve their intentionalities.  Accessing specialist  status provides them with linguistic
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deontic powers that can be positive or negative. Some of the positive deontic powers
they enjoy include:
the right to use the community’s SL as a legitimate insider;
the possibility of enjoying persuasive authority among peers through SL mastery;
access to the community’s communicative universe (journals, symposia, forums…) as both
readers and authors for project and career furtherance;
the prerogative of expressing their views in keynote lectures, speeches, papers, prefaces,
forewords, introductions, media interviews…
21 The foremost and overarching deontic  power in SL use,  however,  is  the specialists’
right to take part in the collective acceptance process by which the community creates
and  shapes  the  SL  in  question  through  adapted  “X counts  as Y”  rules.  They  will
typically contribute to committees that decide on SL new words, new meanings, new
genres or on their evolution. Recent debates on the concept of anthropocene2 among
geologists illustrate the deontic power of these specialists with regard to the evolution
of their SL.
22 Negative linguistic deontic powers include various types of obligations. SL use has to be
accurate since malpractice may result from wrong language use in many domains (e.g.
law,  medicine,  air  and  marine  navigation…).  It also  requires  situational  relevance
because specialists must carefully adapt their discourse to facts, cases, issues, analyses,
rulings…  Another  obligation  is  keeping  up-to-date  since  preserving  their  linguistic
authority depends on being abreast of SL evolutions. However, the foremost obligation
towards  the  community’s  collective  acceptance  of  its SL  is  that,  through  language
creation and evolution, specialists must serve their domain’s intentionality, not their
own personal interests. One telling example of such conflict dates back to the 1980s and
concerns  Linus  Pauling,  an  American  chemist  and  twice  Nobel  prize  laureate,  who
refused to include quasicrystals in the definition of crystal in spite of the fact that Dan
Shechtman,  an  Israeli  scientist,  had provided scientific  evidence  of  their  existence.
Pauling had, in fact, acted out of pure personal interest because Shechtman’s findings
clashed  with  his  own.  In 1992  the  International  Union  of  Crystallography,  braving
Pauling’s proscription, modified the definition of this key concept and Shechtman was
awarded the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 2011.3
 
2.3. ESP practitioners’ deontic powers with regard to SL use
23 An ancillary question in this respect concerns whether ESP practitioners as linguists
who are not domain specialists, but who presumably master SLs, have specific deontic
powers. Our answer would be that they do, but that these deontic powers derive from
their  status  as  teachers—thereby  serving  a  different  intentionality—and  that  they
markedly differ from those of the specialists. Even though they are not domain insiders
and,  as  such,  not  entitled  to  access  the  community’s  communicative  universe  or
express  their  views  regarding  domain-specific  matters,  as  ESP actors,  teachers
nevertheless face obligations of accuracy, correctness and up-to-dateness in SL use and
instruction. As we see it, the positive deontic powers they can lay claim to—authority
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3. Applying critical approaches to deontic powers
3.1. Disentangling deontic powers from social conditions
24 In most situations, there is not much to be critical about as regards deontic powers;
Searle insists human societies would not work at all without status functions and the
distribution of power they imply as these provide the foundations of a major part of
our civilised activities (2010: 201–2). In this perspective, we beg to differ slightly from
some of critical approaches to power-language relations.
25 For example, in Fairclough’s classic Language and Power, the author analyses “unequal”
power relationships expressed through linguistic intercourse between protagonists. His
first two examples feature a police officer interviewing a witness (1989: 18–19) and a
hospital doctor tutoring a medical student during a visit to a neonatal unit (ibid.: 44–5).
Fairclough underlines  how the  policeman and  the  doctor  keep  firm control  of  the
verbal exchange (by interrupting, asking questions and correcting their interlocutor).
He observes  that  the  policeman  expresses  no  acknowledgment  for  the  information
provided by the witness. He even suggests that the latter would have expected none
anyway, while some form of gratitude would have come more naturally in the context
of “a friendly conversation”. He notes that the doctor’s language with his student is
often “arrogant”, “abrupt” and “curt”. He concludes that these examples illustrate how
“powerful  participants”  control  and  constrain  “non-powerful  participants”  through
discourse (ibid.: 46),  and that these language properties are not “arbitrary”, but are
determined by “social conditions” (ibid.: 19).
26 Of course, Fairclough may have a point; on the other hand, he may also have bypassed a
crucial characteristic of these verbal exchanges. Both are staged in workplace settings
and feature professionals who are assigned institutional functions and their related
deontic powers. Admittedly, these actors may misuse or abuse their powers, but the
resulting  unbalanced  relationships  expressed  in  their  speech  may  stem more  from
mismanaged deontic powers than from their “social conditions” as powerful (or non-
powerful)  participants.  This  would  equate  deontic  powers  with  social  conditions,
which, we think, begs demonstration, at least. Indeed, simply imagine—as in the pitch
of  some  Hollywood  comedy  films—that  the  professional  tables  turn.  The  doctor
happens to take amateur sailing lessons with a sailing instructor who is none other
than his  medical  student.  In blustery gales and choppy waters,  captains tend to be
pretty directive in their navigation orders and the doctor-apprentice helmsman would
most certainly be sharply told off by his former student-turned-skipper if he messed up
at the wheel.
27 Similarly, fancy the police officer suffers from diabetes and gets a stern dressing-down
from  his GP—the  witness  interviewed,  as  may  be  guessed—for  not  sticking  to  the
stringent treatment she has prescribed. Who would be “powerful” and “non-powerful”
in these new situations? Inequalities would be totally reversed and it is language that
would  express  the  inverted  hierarchies.  Presumably,  these  protagonists’  “social
conditions”  have  not  been  turned  upside  down  overnight;  however,  the  new
professional circumstances have thoroughly reshuffled their respective deontic powers
and overturned power relations. That is why the witness interviewed was not expecting
acknowledgment  for  the  information  she  provided:  she  knew  full  well  that  police
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officers’ deontic powers contain no obligation to express gratitude to informants (even
if some of them do).
28 Fairclough’s  further  remark  that  acknowledgments  are  expected  in  friendly
conversations fails to realise that professional deontic powers rarely involve friends,
and that this amounts to comparing apples and pears. The point is not to deny that
social  conditions  may  determine  discourse  and  vice  versa,  but  simply  that,  in  the
examples presented by Fairclough, the “social” critical approach seems misguided since
professional deontic powers are not factored in. Language users may in turn be one’s
doctor, sports coach, plumber, banker, yoga instructor, accountant, lawyer, air hostess,
tax inspector…, and discourse has to be adapted to evolving deontic situations.
29 Simpson, Mayr and Statham use an “adapted” version of Fairclough’s “doctor/medical
student”  situation  to  show  how  “a  more  powerful  participant  interrupt[s]  a
subordinate person” (2019: 12–13). Their diagnosis broadly follows Fairclough’s, but is
more  analytically  nuanced  and  appears  to  be  surprisingly  reminiscent  of  Searle’s
theoretical  apparatus:  “[…]  it is  the  institutionally  determined  social  roles  that
determine the discoursal rights and obligations of the speakers.” (Ibid.: 13) We broadly
agree with this conclusion and would simply add that: (1) “institutional determination”
is  a  vague  descriptive  notion  which  is  more  convincingly  theorised  by  Searle’s
constitutive  rules;  (2) “social  roles”  are  rather  “professional  roles”,  and  changing
professional  situations  regularly  reshuffle  participants’  power and  subordination;
(3) the notions of “rights and obligations” are very convincingly theorised by Searle’s
deontic powers.
 
3.2. Critical approaches to over-specialised languages: the case of
plain language movements
30 The so-called plain language movement that campaigns against the obscurity of some
SLs is another type of critical approach worth examining in our specialised language-
power  study.5 Plain  language  activists  target  what  they  deem  overly  complex SLs,
especially  when these  involve  public  users,  which,  for instance,  is  the  case  for  the
English of law (“legalese”), technology (“techno babble”) and finance (“stock market
jargon”). They claim that linguistic obfuscation is produced by specialists on purpose to
generate  unequal  power  relations  between  insiders  and  outsiders  and  serve  the
formers’  interests.  Public  and  private  initiatives  multiply  to  encourage  or  force
specialised  communities  to  use  plain  English in,  among  others,  legal,  medical  and
financial discourse. These critical postures aptly point to blatant abuses in linguistic
deontic  powers.  In  the  beliefs  and  desires  they  strive  to  satisfy,  many  specialised
intentionalities aim to serve the public; artificial over-complexity in language operates
as a disservice to outsiders and frustrates this mission. We may, hence, conclude that
these  plain  language  critical  approaches  are  fully  justified  so  as  to  restore  a  level
playing field between SL insiders and outsiders.
31 Yet, the question subsists as to what extent SLs should be made plain. What level of SL
simplification or “despecialisation” would seem acceptable to all parties? Can SLs be
made as plain as general language? Opinions vary on the subject, but IA paves the way
for  some  suitable  answers.  As  seen  above,  the  example  of  geologists  and
crystallographers illustrates the fact that one major linguistic deontic power held by
specialists  is  their  right  to  contribute  to  the  collective  acceptance  that  specialises
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language. It is up to geologists, and none other, to trigger an “X counts as Y in C” rule
that  will  make anthropocene an  officially  recognised concept  in  their  community.  If
plain language activists intervene in the process, they act without the proper linguistic
deontic powers and curtail the specialists’  legitimate authority to make constitutive
rules  in  language  matters.  If  SLs  become  excessively  “despecialised”,  specialised
communities may lose the capacity to communicate as they see fit and eventually face
extinction.
32 This denouement is not in the public interest and specialised deontic powers cannot be
simply brushed aside. Despecialisation programmes must, at least partly, stem from the
specialists’ own awareness that their SL needs to be simplified (which is often the case),
and a finely tuned balance between their deontic powers and public interest has to be
struck to find suitable forms of collective acceptance that preserve the specialists’ right
to use constitutive rules.
 
4. Is language a powerful master? Assessing the
actual power of language
33 This paper opened with Gorgias’ proposition that “speech is a powerful lord” and most
books on the “language-and-power” theme emphasise the importance and power of
language in shaping human affairs and hierarchies (e.g. Fairclough, 1989: 2–4). Yet, in
the light of IA,  some of these postures may be revisited to examine the real  power
wielded by language.
34 We begin with the fact that Searle’s theory of IA posits that intentionality precedes
language:
Language  is  derived  from  Intentionality  and  not  conversely.  The  direction  of
pedagogy is to explain Intentionality in terms of language; the direction of logical
analysis is to explain language in terms of Intentionality. (Searle, 1983: 5)
The intentionality of language has to be explained in terms of the intentionality of
the mind and not conversely. […] The meaning of language is derived intentionality
and  it  has  to  be  derived  from  the  original  intentionality  of  the  mind.  (Searle,
2004: 113)
35 The resulting fact that language serves the beliefs and desires contained in original
intentional  states  implies  that  intentionalities  are  at  the  origin  of  power  and  that
language, per se, is powerless.  As such, it  becomes obvious that it is the intensity of
intentional  desires  and  beliefs  that  generate  power.  Language,  however  artful  and
elaborate, can yield no power if intentional beliefs and desires are lacking.
36 The example of crystallographers clearly illustrates the point. Linus Pauling’s beliefs
about quasicrystals  were found to be inadequate when serving the purposes of  the
specialised intentionality of crystallography. His desire to prevail against Shechtman
was vigorously expressed through repeated attacks in research symposia and papers.
However,  colleagues  observed  that  these  attacks  appeared  increasingly  depleted  of
scientific content and were reduced to mere verbal animosity. The influence of Pauling
as a public authority and his linguistic virulence proved to be helpless when opposed to
a proposition which was serving crystallography better than his own. The bottom line
was that language duly followed intentionality; the key concept in crystallography was
changed because Shechtman’s intentionality proved more powerful than Pauling’s.
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37 To  conclude  on  this  point,  it  would  appear  that  Gorgias’  proposition  needs  to  be
qualified: language is a powerless master, albeit a powerful servant of intentionalities.
As the common phrase “empty rhetoric” suggests, language is void of power when it is
void of intentionality.6
 
5. The intentional approach to power-language issues
in ESP teaching contexts
38 Learners generally appreciate hearing about the benefits to be gained from studying
their  particular  subject-domain.  ESP students  will  certainly  be  keen to  explore  the
deontic powers of their specialisms, providing them with a number of motivational
incentives, and teachers with valuable pedagogical leverage. Students will discover the
rights, permissions and entitlements related to their future professional status, but also
that the advantages they enjoy balance with duties, obligations and prohibitions. Their
linguistic deontic powers will show them how they can become insiders in specialised
communities, but also that the requirements of correctness, rigour, accuracy and up-
datedness  expected  from  them  by  teachers  are  symmetrically  justified.  They  will
become aware of the need to take heed of power-language issues in their use of SLs
with  outsiders,  especially  in  specialisms  where  plain  language  initiatives  urge
specialists to respect the public’s right to understand what specialised discourse means
with regard to their matters of concern.
39 In the specific case of L2 learners, exploring the deontic world of their English-speaking
colleagues will enrich the students’ perception of the cultural dimension of specialised
communities  worldwide.  Interesting  contrastive  pedagogical  projects  may  compare
how  deontic  powers  are  perceived  in  the  learners’  national  contexts  and  abroad.
References abound in this field of ESP enquiry and education, both online and in print.
Authentic documents include numerous codes of deontology and ethical guidelines,7
plain English manuals and recommendations (e.g. Securities and Exchange Commission,
1998;  Garner,  2001)  which  can  be  used  to  build  case  studies,  task-based  modules,
questionnaires, research projects, etc., in order to teach both content and deontic lexis
in SLs.
40 For their part, practising and would-be ESP teachers may develop their “encyclopaedic
knowledge” in the SLs they teach by exploring the diachronic dimensions of power-
language issues,  which evolve through time.8 While  certain communities  have been
aware  of  them  for  a  long  time  and  have  published  codified  versions  of  their
commitments, other groups have discovered them relatively recently and have yet to
clarify their position on the subject. Historical studies and teaching offer fascinating
insights into power-language stakes in specialised communities and SLs.
 
Conclusion
41 This paper explores the relations between power and language from the perspective of
the Intentional Approach to SLs. A recently updated book on the subject, Language and
Power published  by  Simpson,  Mayr  &  Statham (2019),  offers  a  starting  point  in  its
observation that “language is the principal means by which institutions create their
own  reality”  (ibid.: 7).  This  proposition  is  given  practical  rationality  through  John
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Searle’s  theory  of  collective  intentionality  in  which  language  creates  social  and
institutional objects through “X counts as Y in C” constitutive rules. The validity of the
theory lies in that it generates the notion of deontic powers that are attached to social
agents’ statuses and functions. This theoretical apparatus is then applied to the study
of specialisedness in the intentional approach to SLs. It proposes that specialisedness
derives from “specialised intentional mental states” and that specialised languages are
also created by similar constitutive rules. The relations between deontic powers and
language  is  then  explored,  both  in  non-specialised  and  specialised  cases,  with  an
additional  focus  on  the  “linguistic  deontic  powers”  of  specialists.  The  Intentional
Approach to  SLs  envisages  language-power  issues  in  a  more  professional  way  than
critical ones which tend to be more socially and politically oriented. Unbalanced social
hierarchies featuring powerful and non-powerful discourse participants are viewed less
dramatically  when  professional  deontic  powers  are  factored  into  the  analysis  than
when static social classes seem to be durably pitted against one another by discourse.
The paper also tackles the issue of power inequality between SL insiders and outsiders.
It agrees that plain language initiatives launched to clarify excessively obscure SLs are
fully  justified.  Yet,  it  also  argues  that  linguistic  demagoguery  should  not  pursue
excessive  linguistic  despecialisation  since  such  moves  would  seriously  impair  the
inherent deontic rights of specialists to create and modify their SLs. A major inference
of the intentional approach leads to underline the intrinsic powerlessness of language
itself since the power that it conveys stems from the beliefs and desires generated by
intentionalities. The paper concludes that these power-language issues lend themselves
to  fruitful  pedagogical  developments.  Learners  also  discover  the  deontic  powers
attached to their domain’s specialism and their related rights and obligations as future
specialists.  In  the  process  of  constructing  their professional  profiles,  they  must  be
made aware of potentially negative insider-outsider power inequalities, and familiar
with the requirements of plain language initiatives to reduce these inequalities.
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NOTES
1. In the context of this paper, no significant technical difference is made between language and
discourse  because  it  would  be  of  little  consequence  in  the  argumentation.  For  a  clear-cut
distinction between specialised language and discourse, see Van der Yeught (2019b: 77–8).
2. Anthropocene is a term used to designate the planet’s current geological age seen as a period
during  which  human  activity  exercises the  most  dominant  influence  on  climate  and
environment.
3. Numerous newspaper articles have given detailed accounts of Prof. Shechtman’s career and
discoveries.  The most  comprehensive was probably published by The Guardian on 6th January
2013:  <www.theguardian.com/science/2013/jan/06/dan-shechtman-nobel-prize-chemistry-
interview>.
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4. Developing this point is beyond the scope of this paper, but interested readers may find the
following  references  useful  to  go  deeper  into  the  notion  of  “specialised  encyclopaedic
knowledge” (Van der Yeught, 2016: 56–7; 2018: 11–13; 2019a: chaps 41–51; 2019b: 78–81).
5. Online and print references to plain language initiatives are extremely numerous. The official
website of the U.S. government on plain language features a link to the Plain Language Act 2010:
“An act to enhance citizen access to Government information and services by establishing that
Government documents issued to the public must be written clearly, and for other purposes”.
(<www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines>)
6. Interestingly,  a  French  17th-century  moralist  writer,  La Rochefoucauld,  offers  an  elegant
description of  the persuasive  powerlessness  of  language when decoupled from intentionality
(passion,  in  this  case).  His  8th maxim reads:  “Passions  are  the  only  advocates  which always
persuade. They are a natural art, with infallible rules; and the simplest man with passion will be
more  persuasive  than  the  most  eloquent  without.” (< www.gutenberg.org/files/9105/9105-h/
9105-h.htm>) [“Les passions sont les seuls orateurs qui persuadent toujours. Elles sont comme un art de la
nature dont les règles sont infaillibles ; et l’homme le plus simple qui a de la passion persuade mieux que le
plus éloquent qui n’en a point.”]
7. For example,  the  Chicago-based  Ethics  Code  Collection  is  a  database  that  contains  over
2,500 modern and historical codes of ethics from 1,500 organisations and some 30 specialisms. Cf.
<https://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/#main-content>.
8. On the diachronic dimension of SLs and encyclopaedic knowledge, see Van der Yeught (2018
and 2019a).
ABSTRACTS
The purpose of  this  paper is  to  study ESP power issues in the framework of  the intentional
approach (IA) to specialised languages (SLs). IA has recently emerged in France (Van der Yeught,
2016, 2018, 2019a, 2019b) as an attempt to theorise the study of SLs. It differs from standard ESP
postures because it tries to account for “specialisedness”—the mental disposition of a person who
specialises—before examining how language serves the purposes of specialisations. The approach
is  dubbed  “intentional”  because  specialisedness  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  forms  of
“intentionality”—mental  states  about  objects  outside  the  mind—as  theorised  by  American
philosopher John Searle (1983, 2004). It is promisingly fruitful to examine power issues in the
light of IA because the group extension of intentionality, “collective intentionality”, is, in Searle’s
theory, the main originator of social reality (Searle, 1995, 2010). Since the most common forms of
power observable  in  modern specialised communities  are  social  creations,  it  makes  sense  to
study them as intentionally-created social realities. Still, until recently, power issues have not
attracted notable interest among ESP authors although some researchers have come to bridge
the gap (Orts, Breeze & Gotti, 2017; Paltridge & Starfield, 2013). This paper first presents a brief
summary of the IA project and endeavours to clarify the epistemological standing of power in
relation to SLs. The second section is devoted to power allocation in specialised communities,
and examines the “deontic powers” (Searle, 2010: 105) that come with specialist status, especially
regarding SL use. The third section discusses critical approaches regarding these deontic powers,
especially in the context of plain English movements.  The fourth focuses on the issue of the
actual  power  of  language  itself.  The  final  section  identifies  several  attractive  opportunities
offered by the language-power theme to teach ESP.
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Cet article étudie les problématiques de pouvoir en anglais de spécialité (ASP) dans le cadre de
l’approche intentionnelle (AI) des langues de spécialité (LSP). L’AI s’est développée récemment en
France  (Van der Yeught,  2016,  2018,  2019a,  2019b)  afin  de  théoriser  l’étude  des LSP.  Elle  se
distingue de l’English for Specific Purposes parce qu’elle s’emploie à rendre compte du « spécialisé »
— la disposition mentale d’une personne qui se specialise — avant d’examiner comment la langue
sert les finalités de diverses spécialisations. L’approche est dite « intentionnelle » parce que le
spécialisé  y  est  conçu  comme  l’une  des  formes  de  « l’intentionnalité »  — les  états  mentaux
portant  sur  des  objets  extérieurs  à  l’esprit —  telle  que  John  Searle (1983),  un  philosophe
américain, la théorise. Il est prometteur d’envisager les problématiques de pouvoir à la lumière
de l’AI parce que « l’intentionnalité collective » constitue pour Searle (1995, 2010) l’origine de la
réalité  sociale.  Les  types  de  pouvoir  les  plus  répandus  dans  les  communautés  spécialisées
modernes relèvent de la création sociale et il est donc pertinent de les étudier comme émanant
d’intentionnalités.  Néanmoins,  malgré  quelques  publications  récentes  (Orts,  Breeze  &  Gotti, 
2017 ;  Paltridge  & Starfield,  2013),  les  questions  de  pouvoir  n’ont  guère  suscité  l’intérêt  des
chercheurs. Cet article présente d’abord un résumé de l’AI et clarifie le statut épistémologique du
pouvoir dans ses relations avec les LSP. Une deuxième section est consacrée à l’allocation du
pouvoir  dans  les  communautés  spécialisées  et  étudie  les  « pouvoirs  déontiques »  (Searle,
2010 : 105) qui sont attachés au statut de spécialiste, en particulier dans l’utilisation des LSP. Une
troisième section étudie les approches critiques des pouvoirs déontiques,  notamment dans le
contexte des mouvements prônant la simplification linguistique. Dans une quatrième section, la
question  du  pouvoir  effectif  du  langage  lui-même  est  posée.  La  dernière  section  identifie
plusieurs  approches  pédagogiques  prometteuses  pour  tirer  parti  de  la  thématique  langue-
pouvoir.
INDEX
Mots-clés: pouvoir, approche intentionnelle, intentionnalité collective, réalité sociale, pouvoir
déontique
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